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... If you were to sit as a juror in this case and

the jury were to convict the defendant of
capital murder, would you also be able to con47
sider voting for a sentence less than death?
The court concluded that these questions sufficed to
conduct the Wainwright inquiry as to the ability of the
prospective jurors to perform their duties in accordance
with their instructions and their oaths. 8 These questions
clearly were not designed to elicit complex, honest responses from jurors but instead seem aimed at securing perfunctory monosyllabic responses. Indeed, it seems that these
questions, in substance, are directed at nothing more than
determining"whether a juror can be fair, or follow the law,"
11d. Mackall's counsel was denied the opportunity to question jurors as to their substantive views concerning the death
penalty. See supra note 40.

-

Page 41

which the court deemed insufficient to make the constitutionally required inquiry 9
Defense counsel in capital cases should strive to secure
the opportunity to conduct a meaningful voir dire, which
would encompass asking questions designed to engage the
prospective jurors in more honest, revealing conversations
about their views regarding the death penalty and thus
identify and exclude from the jury individuals whose views
would interfere with their abilities to perform their duties.
The Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse Trial Manual offers
suggestions and strategies for conducting a meaningful voir
dire.
Summary and analysis by:
Anne E. Duprey
49

1d.

48

131 E3d at 451.
Mackall II,

PIATH v. MOORE
130 F.3d 595 (4th Cir. 1997)
United States Court Of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Nearly twenty years ago, two cousins, John Plath and
JohnArnold,' and each of their girlfriends, Carol Ullman and
Cindy Sheets,2 decided to go on a search for wild mushrooms.' After borrowing a car and setting out on their expedition, the group came upon Betty Gardner, a farm worker,
walking along the side of the road.4 After dropping Gardner
off at her brother's home,' the group, at Arnold's sugges7
tion," decided to go back and kill Gardner.
After picking up Gardner, they took her to a remote
wooded area near a garbage dump. There, all four in the
group, at one time or another,physically assaulted Gardner.8
Based on the testimony at trial, the court of appeals developed the following scenario of what took place at that
remote wooded area. Initially, Arnold knocked Gardner to
the ground, and he and Plath began kicking her.9 Then Plath
ordered Gardner to remove her clothes, and forced her to
'See Case Summary of Arnold,Cap. Def.J.,Vol. 10, No. 1,p.7.
2The two cousins were in their twenties, and their girlfriends,
Ullman and Sheets, were eleven and seventeen years old respectively.
3Plath v. Moore, 130 E3d 595, 597 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing
Arnold v.Evatt, 113 E3d 1352,1355 (4th Cir. 1997)).
4
Plath, 130 E3d at 597 (citingArnold, 113 E3d at 1355).
'Gardner asked the group for a ride to work, but they refused.
6Arnold, 113 E3d at 1355.
7
Plath, 130 E3d at 597 (citingArnold, 113 E3d at 1355).
8
ld. at 597.
9Id. at 597.

perform oral sex upon both himself and his girlfriend,
Sheets. While Gardner performed oral sex on Sheets, Plath
beat Gardner with a leather belt, and later urinated in
Gardner's mouth, forcing her to swallow the urine. 0
Plath and Arnold then unsuccessfully attempted to kill
Gardner by strangling her with part of a garden hose.After
this first effort failed, Plath continuously stomped on
Gardner's neck for a period of time, followed by his stabbing of her some ten times in the chest." Using the garden
hose, Arnold dragged Gardner by the neck into the nearby
wooded area. He returned to say that he did not think
Gardner was dead, whereby Plath told Sheets to cut
Gardner's throat with a broken bottle." Gardner finally died
after Sheets and Arnold strangled her a second time with
the hose. 3
By jury trial, the South Carolina Court of General
Sessions convicted both Plath and Arnold of the kidnapping, rape and murder of Gardner, and subsequently sentenced both to death. The South Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed the convictions, but reversed the death sentences,

'11d. at 597.

"According to testimony, at this point in the murder, Plath
commented that"niggers are sure hard to kil' Plath, 130 E3d at
597.
"Id.at 597.
'31d. at 597. Arnold attempted to mislead the police by carving "KKK" into Gardner's body. Nonetheless, Sheets led the police
to Gardner's decomposed body almost six weeks later.
"Id.at 597.
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and remanded the case for resentencing.' 5 The second jury
recommended the death penalty, and the South Carolina
Supreme Court affirmed Plath's death sentence. 6 After the
United States Supreme Court denied Plath's writ of certiorari,' 7 he applied for Post-Conviction Relief ("PCR") in the
South Carolina Court of General Sessions. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Court of General Sessions dismissed
Plath's PCR application on May 12,1986.8
Plath again applied for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court, and this time the Court granted his application. In light of Yates v. Evatt,'9 the Court remanded
Plath's case to the Court of General Sessions for reconsideration of the issue of whether the implied malice instruction given at Plath's original trial" violated his right to due
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution, and, if so, whether that violation constituted reversible error.2' The Court of General Sessions held
that the implied malice instruction did not violateYates, and
that, even if it did, that violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.22
On March 5,1990, the Court of General Sessions denied
Plath's third amended PCR application. 21 On appeal, the
South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed this denial, holding
that, although the implied malice instruction violated Yates,
it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.24 The United
States Supreme Court denied Plath certiorari on February
22,1993.5
Plath next petitioned for habeas relief in the United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina. The State

'5State v. Plath, 284 S.E.2d 221 (S.C. 1981).
'6State v. Plath,313 S.E.2d 619 (S.C. 1984).
'7Plathv. South Carolina,467 U.S. 1265 (1984).
'8Plathv.Moore, 130 E3d 595,597 (4th Cir. 1997).

'9500 U.S. 391 (1971) (holding that implied malice instruction
was constitutional error subject to harmless-error analysis). Yates
explained that the reviewing court must only determine that the
erroneous instruction was unimportant in relation to the other
evidence which was considered by the jury, independently of the
erroneous presumption. Yates, 484 U.S. at 403. Under Yates, the
reviewing court must ask "what evidence the jury actually considered in reaching its verdict" and must "weigh the probative force
of that evidence against the probative force" of the erroneous presumption standing alone. Id.at 404.
2The trial court instructed the jury that murder is "the killing
of any person with malice aforethought either express or implied:
Furthermore, the trial court stated that malice may be expressed
"as where one makes previous threats of vengeance or where one

lies in wait or other circumstances which show directly that the
intent to kill was really entertained," or may"be implied from the
willful, deliberate and intentional doing of any unlawful act without just cause or excuse, or from the use of a deadly weapon."
Arnold v. Evatt,113 E3d 1352,1356 (4th Cir. 1997).
21
lath, 130 E3d at 597-98.
2Id. at 598.
23

Plath first raised the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and lack of mental competence during the resentencing trial.
Id. at 601-02.
24
1d. at 598.
2

1Plath v. State, 507 U.S. 927 (1993).

moved for summary judgment, and on October 17, 1994, a
U.S. Magistrate recommended denial of habeas corpus relief.'
After granting the State's motion for summary judgment, the
district court denied habeas relief on September 3, 1996, and
denied Plath's motion to amend his PCR application on
January 30,1997. 27 Plath appealed the denial of habeas relief.
HOIDING
The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit,
affirmed the district court's denial of the writ of habeas corpus, holding that (1) the unconstitutional implied malice
instruction was harmless error;' (2) defense counsel were
not ineffective;2 9 (3) the claim of alleged lack of mental
competence during resentencing trial was procedurally
barred;10 and (4) the absence of defense counsel from the
jury view of the site of the murders did not deprive peti3
tioner of effective assistance of counsel. 1
ANALYSIS/APPICATION IN VIRGINIA
I.

2
Implied Malice InstructionW

Plath challenged the judge's implied malice instruction
as "clearly unconstitutional," and amounting to reversible
error.3 3As it did in Arnold v. Evatt, the court applied the
5
to determine whether the
two-part test from Yates v.EvatW
instruction "'had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict."' 3 The Yates test
involves: (1) "ask[ing] what evidence the jury actually considered in reaching its verdict;" and (2)"weigh[ing] the probative force of that evidence against the probative force of
37
the [implied malice] presumption standing alone*7

In applying the Yates test to the implied malice instruction in Plath, the court reiterated its conclusion in Arnold,
stating, "'this case reeks of express malice and any reasonable jury, notwithstanding the implied malice instruction,
would have found malice beyond a reasonable doubt!"58
The court reasoned that the instruction in Plath's case was
26Plath, 130 E3d at 598.
27Id. at 598.

2'Id.at 599.

"Id.at 601-02.
"Plath, 130 E3d at 602.
3
'Id.at 602-03.Although Plath raised this issue and the court
reviewed it, this issue will not be discussed in this case summary.
See Case
Summary of Arnold, Cap. Def.J.,Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 7.
32
See Case Summary of Arnold,Cap. Def.J.,Vol. 10, No.1, p. 7 .
The State tried Plath and Arnold together so the analysis of the
implied malice instruction in the Case Summary of Arnold is
applicable to Plath also.
3
1lath, 130 E3d at 598.
14113 E3d 1352 (4th Cir. 1997).
31500 U.S. 391 (1991).
"Arnold, 113 E3d at 1356 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson,

507 U.S. 619,637 (1993)).

37Yates, 500 U.S. at 404.
"Plath, 130 E3d at 598 (quoting Arnold v. Evatt, 113 E3d

1352, 1357 (1997)).
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the same as the one in Arnold's case, and because the
Arnold instruction was harmless error, then so was the
Plath instruction.39
Plath unsuccessfully attempted to distinguish his case
from Arnold's. He argued first that, unlike Arnold, there was
no "clear and independent evidence of malice" that could
be attributed to him.40 In rejecting this argument, the court
composed a list of Plath's malicious acts and commented
that as much, if not more, of the evidence of malice could
be credited to Plath.41
Furthermore, Plath argued that the lack of credibility of
Sheets (a key witness), the existence of exculpatory evidence, and the State's use of the implied malice presumption in its closing argument all went to rebutting the body
of evidence of malice against him.42 Again, the court
returned to Arnold,finding that such circumstances existed
in Arnold's case, but nonetheless it still found the instruction to be harmless error. Therefore, the court found that
the conclusion in Plath should be the same.
The court rejected much of Plath's claim on the
implied malice instruction by repeating its reasoning from
its Arnold decision. Nonetheless, capital defense counsel
can argue that the court should not have found the Arnold
instruction to be harmless error simply on the basis of
Plath because a determination of harmlessness is by definition, a fact-specific determination. In making future challenges to implied malice instructions, capital defense counsel can utilize this requirement of fact-specific harmlessness
findings to distinguish both PlathandArnold.Furthermore,
the decision in Plath is a necessary reminder to capital
defense counsel that Yates offers a viable challenge to the
implied malice instruction and that this challenge should
always be made. When making such a challenge, capital
defense counsel should keep in mind that the defense bears
the burden of proof under the Yates analysis.
H. In Favorem Vitae Review
A. Background
Under in favorem vitae review, a court reviews "'the
entire record for legal error, and assumes error when unobjected-to but technically improper arguments, evidence,
jury charges, etc. are asserted by the defendant on appeal in

39

Md. at 598.
0Id. at 599.
4
"id. at 599.The court attributed the following malicious acts
to Plath: (1) compelling the victim to undress; (2) forcing the victim to perform oral sex upon him; (3) forcing the victim to perform oral sex upon someone else; (4) striking the victim with a
leather belt while she performed oral sex upon another person;
(5) dragging the victim by the neck with a leather belt; (6) urinating in the victim's mouth; (7) assisting in strangling the victim with
a rubber hose; (8) stabbing the victim; and (9) directing another
person
to "finish off" the victim.
4
zPlath, 130 E3d at 599.

a demand for reversal or a new trial.'"" This type of review
enables the appellate court to examine the record for error
regardless of whether the error was preserved by an objection.44 However, in Kornahrensv.Evatt,45 the South Carolina
Supreme Court rejected the doctrine of in favorem vitae
review because the court could not determine whether the
state court had properly applied federal constitutional principles or had even considered those issues at all.46 The
defendant in Kornahrens argued that in using in favorem
vitae review for all errors on direct appeal, the South
Carolina Supreme Court considered the three errors he did
not raise on appeal, and consequently the errors were not
procedurally defaulted.'The court dismissed this argument
in conjunction with its rejection of in favorem vitae review,
stating that to review effectively a state-court judgment, it
must be clear the state court addressed the federal consti48
tutional issue on the merits.
B. The "Re-rejection" of In Favorem Vitae Review
In challenging the State's improper arguments at both
the guilt and sentencing phases as violative of due process,
Plath attempted to utilize the in favorem vitae review doctrine to argue that these errors were preserved for habeas
review. 9 Plath acquiesced that these improper arguments
were not raised on direct appeal. However, he alleged that
they were examined at the state level because of the South
Carolina Supreme Court's practice of in favorem vitae
review.
Despite the fact that the court rejected this same argument inArnold," Plath again sought to distinguish his case.
First, the May 12, 1986 court order which dismissed Plath's
PCR application explicitly stated that the South Carolina
Supreme Court had conducted an in favorem vitae review
of the case.51 Second, at the time of Plath's appeal, the South
Carolina Supreme Court operated under a custom of
"'reviewing closing arguments in capital cases regardless of
whether an issued [sic] had been raised at trial or on
appeal'" 52The court rejected both of these grounds, stating
that it had declined to recognize such implied review for
habeas matters because in favorem vitae review provided
federal courts with inadequate records in their determinations of whether state courts had considered federal constitutional issues, and not because the review did not exist. 3
Therefore, the court concluded that as in Arnold, the issue
43
Kornabrens v. Evatt, 66 E3d 1350, 1362 (4th Cir. 1995)
(quoting State v. Torrence, 406 S.E.2d 315,324 (S.C. 1991)).
,Kornahrens, 66 E3d at 1362.

41d. at 1350.

"Id.at 1362.
47
d. at 1362.
4
sKornahrens,66 F.3d at 1363.
Plath,130 E3d at 599.
5Arnold, 113 E3d at 1357.

"Plath,130 E3d at 599.
521d. at 599-600 (quoting Petitioner's Br. at 17 (citing State v.
Gilbert,258 S.E.2d 890,894 (S.C. 1979))).
531d. at 600.
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of improper arguments was procedurally defaulted in
Plath's case. 4
Capital defense counsel should be aware of this "rerejection" of the in favorem vitae, or implied, review.
Furthermore, they should be on notice that the idea of an
issue being "implicit in" a review conducted by a state
court, and thereby not procedurally defaulted for federal
habeas, is not going to be accepted by the United States
Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit. The court's reiteration of
its rejection of in favorem vitae review clearly dictates this
inevitable conclusion.

5

MI. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
In making a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must meet the test outlined in Strickland v.
Washington,6 which requires a showing that counsel's
action was both professionally deficient and the cause of
prejudice to the defendant. 7 Plath's claim addressed three
instances of conduct by his attorney. First, Plath argued that
his attorneys' failure to object to the use of an immunity
agreement between the State and Cindy Sheets, the key witness for the prosecution, that mentioned Sheets submission
58
to a polygraph test satisfied the Strickland standard.
Secondly, Plath faulted counsel's failure to lay the proper
foundation to admit evidence of x-rays of his leg, broken
before the murder, which would have aided in rebutting
Sheets's testimony about Plath "stomping" the victim. 9 The
court dismissed both of these grounds as not prejudicial,
and therefore failing to meet the test under Strickland.
Specifically, the court found the first action to be part of the
defense counsel's "trial strategy," and the second action to
be not objectively unreasonable in light of the fact that
counsel presented other evidence of the broken leg.'4
As grounds for his third claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, Plath cited his attorneys' failure to present additional mitigating evidence, in that his counsel should have
conducted a more thorough investigation into Plath's background and mental state. 6' Plath argued that such additional mitigating evidence would have persuaded a jury to
impose a life sentence instead of the death penalty.
Although the court conceded that Plath's brief drew a
"striking picture of Plath's tragic background and extremely unstable mental state;' it also found this ground to be
without merit.62 First, the issue was procedurally defaulted
because Plath did not raise it until his final motion to amend
his application for PCR.63 Moreover, the court found no

5Id. at

601.
601.

Plath, 130 E3d at 601.

6

IV. Waiver of Mental Competency Hearing
Plath also alleged that his lack of mental competency
during the resentencing trial violated his rights under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.69 The
court rejected this allegation, finding that the issue was procedurally barred because Plath did not raise it until his final
motion to amend his PCR application." Plath attempted to
rebut the presumption that his claim was procedurally

600.

"Mrginia does not have in favorem vitae review so this analysis is specific to South Carolina.
56466 U.S. 668 (1984).
"Strickland,466 U.S. at 687.
"Plath, 130 E3d at 600.
"Id.at 601.
6
01d. at
61
1d. at
62

showing of cause and prejudice or of a fundamental miscarriage of justice in order to override the procedural
default.
Second, the court reasoned that although defense counsel did not thoroughly explore Plath's background and mental state, they nevertheless conducted a reasonable examination.6 1 In determining such reasonableness, the court
noted that at least ten witnesses testified about Plath's background. Furthermore, the court found that when this mitigating evidence was compared to "the sheer magnitude of
the aggravating evidence against Plath" it could not fathom
how the omission of such mitigating evidence was prejudicial. 65 In referring to Strickland, the court in Plath stated
that"' [g]iven the overwhelming aggravating factors, there is
no reasonable probability that omitted evidence would
have changed the conclusion that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and,
hence the sentence imposed.'" ' The court concluded that
the mitigating evidence was inadequate to shift the balance
for Plath after it had weighed the omitted evidence against
the evidence which was used to convict and sentence
67
him.
The court's rejection of the first two grounds of Plath's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim are reminders to capital defense counsel of how difficult the Strickland standard is to meet. 68The analysis of the third ground, the attorneys' failure to conduct a more extensive examination of
Plath's background and mental state, is also a lesson for capital defense counsel. Given the balancing test that the court
used to determine whether the omitted mitigating evidence
would have produced a different outcome, defense counsel
should be aware of the pitfalls of holding back mitigating
evidence. When the appellate court, and not a jury,balances
the probability of a different result by comparing the mitigating and aggravating factors, withheld mitigating evidence may foreclose relief. Thus, counsel will rarely want to
exclude mitigating witnesses even when their testimony
may be cumulative.

11d.at 601.

mId.
at 601-02.
65
1d. at 602.
6

6Plath, 130 E3d at 602.
1d. at 602.

67

68

Te Plath court itself notes the difficulty of this standard,
stating that the examination of the attorney's conduct must be
quite deferential and the prejudice to the defendant very evident.
Id. at 601.
69
1d. at 602.
7
Plath,130 E3d at 602.
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barred, pointing to a line of South Carolina Supreme Court
to be
cases that have permitted the issue of competence
7
introduced during collateral, or PCR, proceedings. '
In response, the court rejected Plath's rebuttal attempt,
including the supporting cases, distinguishing between a
state court allowing the unraised issue to be included in a
PCR application, and a federal court deliberating it on
habeas review.72 Even in light of the cases cited by Plath, the

court refused to go beyond the limitations of habeas review
established by the principles of comity.This is yet another
example of the stringency of the Strickland standard, and
consequently evidence of the dire necessity of raising all
potential issues at trial in order to preserve them for appeal.
Summary and analysis by:
Mary K. Martin

7

'I. at 602.

72Id. at 602.

SATCIER v. PRUETT
126 F.3d 561 (4th Cir. 1997)'
United States Court Of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Around 7:00 p.m. on the evening of March 31, 1991,
Deborah Abel was riding her bicycle along a path which
2
runs parallel to Lee Highway in Arlington County,Virginia.
As she entered a relatively secluded area on the path, she
noticed an "unthreatening man" walking toward her as she
rode.3 As she passed this man, they made eye contact. 4 Two
or three seconds later, the man grabbed Abel from behind,
knocked her eye-glasses off, pulled her off of her bicycle,
dragged her into a ditch along the path, and began beating
her about the face and head.5 In the ensuing struggle, the
man managed to pull her pants part way down. 6 While Abel
was being assaulted, Mark Polemani was riding his bicycle
along the same stretch of path. Polemani observed a man,
who appeared to be punching the ground, kneeling just off
the path near a prone bicycle. 7 Polemani got off of his bicycle and approached the man.As he did so, however, the man
grabbed Abel's purse and ran away. Polemani briefly chased
the man but eventually returned to assist Abel.
Abel and Polemani each gave the police a description
of Abel's attacker. Abel described him as "a stocky black
male between twenty-five and thirty years old, about 5'9" or
5'10" and 190 to 200 pounds" with a "short 'Afro' haircut"
and no facial scars.8 A police artist made a sketch based on
Abel's description. Polemani gave a similar description and
an "almost identical" sketch was drawn.9 Upon seeing both

'The United States Supreme Court denied Satcher's petition
for a writ of certiorari on December 2,1997.Satcberv.Pruett, 118
S.Ct. 595 (1997). Michael Satcher was executed by lethal injection
on December 9,1997.
2
Satcher v.Pruett, 126 E3d 561,563 (4th Cir. 1997).
3Satcher,126 F3d at 563.
4Id.
'Id at 563-64.
6IeL at 564.
7
Satche, 126 E3d at 564.
81d.
9
d.

sketches, Polemani commented that the sketch based on
Abel's description was "better."'0
On the same evening that Abel was attacked, Ann
Borghesani was attacked as she was walking along the same
stretch of path." Borghesani's partially nude body was discovered shortly after 8:00 a.m. the next morning at the bottom of a stairwell in anAir Force Association building located alongside the bike path less than 100 yards from where
Abel was attacked. 2 Borghesani had been raped and
stabbed twenty-one times with a "sharp-tipped object." 3
Additionally, her purse and some of her jewelry were missing.' 4 A few days later, Borghesani's purse and Abel's purse
were found together in some bushes located about two
blocks from the Air Force Association building.
Michael Satcher was arrested five months later, on
August 18, 1990, for trying to attack three different women
along a different bike path in Arlington County that morning. 6 At the time of his arrest, Satcher, who is AfricanAmerican, was twenty-one years old, 5'6" tall, weighed 152
pounds, had short hair, and a facial scar. 7 Satcher voluntarily gave the police blood, hair, and saliva samples. 8 The blood
test revealed that Satcher's blood type, which occurs in
seven percent of the population, was the same type as the

'0Id. The descriptions given by Abel and Polemani differed
.somewhat" from Satcher's actual appearance. Id. at 564-65. See
infra note 17 and accompanying text.
"Satche, 126 E3d at 564.
2
1

Id.

131d.
14Id.
"Satcher,126 E3d at 564.
6

1d

7

' 1d. at 564. Satcher's actual appearance differed fromAbel and
Polemani's descriptions in four out of the six characteristics they
described. Satcher's age, height, weight and facial scar were all
inconsistent with their descriptions. The only portions of the
descriptions which fit Satcher were"black male" and"short.. .hair."
See, supra, note 10 and accompanying text.
18Id.

